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When Does Policy Deliberation Matter?
Giandomenico Majone 
European University Institute, Florence
A growing body of literature argues that ideas can play an important role in policy 
development and institutional change. The empirical evidence presented by this literature 
is often quite persuasive, but tends to be case-specific. We still lack theoretical 
understanding of the general conditions that favor the use of rational arguments, and of the 
factors affecting the reception of such arguments. The main thesis of this paper is that 
policy ideas and deliberation matter most when public choice is about issues of 
efficiency — how to increase aggregate welfare — rather than about the redistribution of 
resources from one group of society to another. Ideas are powerless if politics is a zero 
sum game; when one group’s gains are another group’s losses only power and interests 
matter. But politics can also be a cooperative, positive sum game in which the members of 
a community engage for mutual advantage. In such a context, analysis and deliberation are 
important for identifying collectively advantageous solutions. Of course, arguments are 
also used to support or oppose redistributive policies. However, if one examines such 
arguments closely, one can see that they are mostly about efficiency issues — for example, 
they are used to show that a particular method of redistributing income, say, by lump-sum 
transfers, is more efficient than one that modifies relative prices, or to suggest methods of 
alleviating the distributional consequences of efficiency-enhancing measures.
The past neglect of the politics of ideas, particularly by neopluralists and 
neocorporatists, was the natural consequence of an almost exclusive focus on redistributive 
policies. On the other hand, the current fascination with policy deliberation reflects a 
growing awareness of the importance of efficiency issues in politics. The shift from 
redistributive to efficiency concerns is one of the distinguishing features of the political 
transformations of the last decade.
The general argument that policy deliberation matters most when public choice is 
about efficiency issues, is developed in the first part of the paper. The second part 




























































































arguments or "rationalizations". Because efficiency is defined relative to a set of feasible 
alternatives, arguments about the feasibility of various policy proposals occupy a central 
position in policy deliberations. Post-decision arguments, on the other hand, facilitate 
cooperation among policy actors by transforming a one-shot situation into an iterated 
game. The requirement that reasons be given for one’s decision, even if the reasons are 
entirely post-hoc, is an essential pre-condition of public discourse.
The rediscovery of efficiency
Policy analysts used to be criticized for being too abstract, too committed to synoptic 
rationalism, not sufficiently attuned to political and institutional realities; in short, they 
were dismissed as being politically irrelevant. In fact, the practical impact of policy 
analysis during the 1960s and most of the 1970s, appeared to be quite limited. Thus, 
several case studies showed that cost-benefit analysis was systematically ignored by 
policymakers in setting priorities or choosing among alternatives, or else was used to 
justify ex post decisions taken on other grounds. Similarly, professional policy evaluation 
seemed to be largely irrelevant to the continuation or termination of public programs.
Then the mood changed. Starting in the late 1970s, analyses produced by a 
growing number of policy think tanks could be shown to have observable impacts. In 
Europe and the United States deregulation, privatization, regulatory reform and welfare 
reform were preceded and prepared by intense intellectual debates. Policy instruments such 
as pollution taxes or emissions trading, long rejected by politicians, bureaucrats and 
environmentalists alike, received serious attention beyond academic circles, and in some 
cases were actually used. American and, more timidly, European courts began to review 
the decisions of administrative agencies in substantive, as well as procedural, terms. A 
spreading belief that public policy should be right, rather than merely the product of group 
struggle, led to demands that administrators should combine ethical discourse and 
technical expertise to achieve synoptic decisions that were substantively correct as well as 
democratically legitimated (Shapiro 1988). From this it was only a small step to suggest 
that courts should require executive agencies to show that they had maximized net social 





























































































Paralleling these developments in public policy and public law, concepts such as 
issue networks, policy learning, politics of ideas, professionalism in policymaking, 
epistemic communities, consensual knowledge and, especially, policy deliberation gained 
wide currency in the literature of political science and international relations. Ideas and 
arguments were no longer seen as simply reflecting group interests or material conditions. 
Rather, it was increasingly accepted that ideas have the power to change the perceptions a 
group has of its own interests, and to make possible new courses of action that change the 
material world itself (Hall 1989).
Again, during the same period the notion of public interest enjoyed a remarkable 
revival. In the 1970s, the economic theory of regulation and, more generally, the public 
choice school were thought to have put public interest theories of politics to rest. Such 
theories, it was argued, represent normative wishes rather than explanations of real world 
phenomena. For example, while the normative or public interest theory of regulation 
regarded market failure as the main justification or motivating reason for introducing 
public regulation, George Stigler argued in a path-breaking article that "regulation is 
acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefits" (Stigler 
1971:3). Stigler’s positive theory assumes that what matters to each participant in the 
regulatory game is their wealth or utility, not aggregate social wealth. Hence the real 
purpose of public regulation is redistribution rather than the gains in allocative efficiency 
that would result from the correction of market failures.
Despite the academic popularity of the economic theory of regulation, it soon 
became clear that its predictive power was limited. Important areas of regulation like 
antitrust, environmental and consumer protection or occupational health and safety can 
hardly be said to be designed and operated primarily for the benefits of producers (Wilson 
1980; Kalt and Zupan 1984; Majone 1989). An even more serious difficulty for Stigler’s 
theory is its failure to provide a satisfactory explanation of why most competitive 
industries are not subject to price or entry regulation, even though the producers should 
find such regulation in their interest. Noting such failures of the positive theory, Peltzman 
(1989:17) observed that "[i]f there is an empirical basis for the normative theory’s 




























































































regulatory origin. The correspondence between the normative theory and the real-world 
allocation of regulatory effort seems striking.'1
These various developments are clearly interconnected: since an efficient policy is 
one that promotes aggregate social welfare rather than the welfare of particular groups, it 
is impossible to identify efficient solutions without appealing to the public interest as 
determined, case by case, through policy deliberation. Thus the emergent view of politics 
as a positive sum game from which all can benefit, displays considerable coherence. 
Although this view, rooted in the philosophy of Locke and the contractarians, denies the 
centrality of redistributive issues and emphasises the correction of market failures and 
provision of pure public goods as the main policy objectives, it cannot be easily located 
along the traditional left-right spectrum. In the United States, for example, both 
progressives and Reagan conservatives believed that government intervention in the 
economy should be justified by reference to market failures and that, in so far as possible, 
cost-benefit tests should be used to set regulatory policy. There was also convergence 
between the two groups in favor of market schemes and the use of economic incentives in 
the implementation of public policies (Rose Ackerman 1992). These positions are now 
widely accepted also by the European Left.
Historically, this ideological convergence is not difficult to explain. Unprecedented 
increases in the costs of redistributive programs during the 1960s and early 1970s (Geiger 
1978) and the explosion of powerful special-interest lobbies -- the main theme of Mancur 
Olson’s controversial book on The Rise and Decline of Nations (1982) — were widely 
perceived by both Left and Right, in Europe as well as in the United States, as a serious 
threat not only to the efficiency but also to the legitimacy of the democratic state. These 
different strands of thought came together in the critique of pluralism.
From pluralist equilibrium to interest-group stasis
According to the founders of modem pluralism, public policy is the equilibrium reached in 
the struggle among competing group interests at a given moment; the legislative vote on 
any issue, a direct reflection of the balance of power among these groups. When the 
groups are adequately stated, everything is stated, Bentley wrote in 1908. In 1956 Dahl 




























































































terms of the contrasts between majorities and minorities: "We can only distinguish groups 
of various types and sizes, all seeking in various ways to advance their goals, usually at 
the expense, at least in part, of others" (Dahl 1956: 131).
A direct corollary of this pluralist reductionism is that neither ideas nor institutions 
matter and, hence, do not need to be included in any formal model of the policy process. 
To quote Bentley again, " [t]he only reality of the ideas is their reflection of the groups, 
only that and nothing more" (Bentley 1967: 169). A group might appeal to the "public 
interest" in support of its claims, but this is nothing more than a publicity ploy to increase 
the attractiveness of its demands. Concerning institutions, Bentley, Truman and especially 
Latham recognized that sometimes public agencies and groups of public officials play an 
independent role, but only as interest groups among other interest groups. For the most 
part, however, the prime actors in policymaking in the pluralist tradition are private groups 
(Lindblom 1965: 13). Lacking any institutional embedding or ideological underpinning, 
policymaking is a series of zero-sum games among unevenly matched players.
Pluralists were of course aware that groups wield unequal power and that access to 
the policy process is unbalanced. Nevertheless, the general conclusion was that all active 
and legitimate groups in the population would be able to make themselves heard at some 
stage in the process. Control over policy outcomes might be unevenly distributed; some 
measure of access is, however, available. This, Dahl concluded, "is no mean thing in a 
political system" (Dahl 1956: 150). Thus, by the early 1960s, pluralism became not only 
an account of what is, but a model of what ought to be.
This benign view of interest group competition was shattered by Mancur Oison’s 
demonstration that commonality of interests is not a sufficient condition for the formation 
of active and legitimate groups. On the contrary, because of the pervasive phenomenon of 
free riding, the special interests of the few tend to be more readily organized into groups 
than the general interests of the many (Olson 1965). By the same logic, given a choice 
between supporting efficiency-increasing or redistributive policies — between trying to 
increase the size of the cake or concentrating on how to cut it -- special- interest groups 
will opt for redistribution since this increases their chances of obtaining a larger share of 
the social output. With time, the growing influence of special-interest lobbies distorts 




























































































termed by Andrew Me Farland "interest group stasis", at best a static, if not a declining 
economy (Me Farland 1992: 60-65). Moreover, the increased emphasis on distributional 
issues due to accumulation of special interest groups makes political life more divisive by 
reducing the significance of widespread common interests. In struggles over redistribution 
no group can gain without other groups losing as much or more, and this generates 
resentment (Olson 1982: 41-47). That one group may lose more than the other group gains 
is of course due to the fact that redistribution is not costless but usually entails a 
"deadweight loss" — the social cost of setting up and operating the redistribution system, 
or of attempting to evade it.
The first response to these criticisms of group politics was, in the words of Martin 
Shapiro, "an almost frantic pursuit of more and more perfect pluralism" (Shapiro 1988:
49). In the 1960s and 1970s pluralism had exerted a strong influence over American 
administrative law. More and more groups were given the right to participate in the 
decision making process of regulatory agencies and to file law suits in courts challenging 
agency decisions they did not like. Agencies were required to accept, and respond to, 
comments on proposed rules from the interested public. Now agencies were asked to 
provide public funding to the poorer groups in order to equalize access to the regulatory 
process. Rules of standing were expanded to include even persons who really had no 
special interest in an administrative decision other than that of a good citizen. "Most 
importantly, the courts began to pour over the rule-making record. They invalidated rules 
if they could find even the tiniest mumble by the tiniest group to which the rule-making 
agency had not responded", (ib.49-50).
But at the time these attempts to perfect group politics were made, disillusion with 
pluralism was already setting in. On the one hand, given the widely varying resources of 
different groups, it was not clear that access to agency decision making could ever be 
effectively equalized. Moreover, experience had shown that the "dialogue" requirement 
could be used by powerful economic interests in order to delay regulatory decisions in 
fields like environmental protection and occupational health and safety. On the other hand, 
mounting evidence about the deadweight losses of group politics gave support to the idea 
that there is a public interest or a right public policy quite apart from the sum of group 




























































































efficient, such as subsidies to fanners or to coal producers, then those policies are 
substantively wrong even if the groups all struggled vigorously.
The politics of efficiency
One solution for many of those dissatisfied with group struggle was to turn to rationality 
or efficiency as criteria for public policy and rational or "synoptic" decision-making 
processes as the best decision-making processes. "Good" policy was no longer to be the 
product of group struggle, but the product of rational policy analysis (Shapiro 1988: IS­
IS). However, it is clear that not all policy issues can be settled by such criteria. Indeed, 
efficiency considerations could hardly play a role in politics if it is true that a political 
situation is "precisely one that arises when the parties are arguing not about mutually 
useful trades but about the legitimacy of one another’s initial position" (Barry 1965: 313). 
In this view efficiency considerations belong the economics, while politics deals with 
redistribution, including the authoritative allocation of property rights. Or, as some authors 
preferred to put it, most economic activity is a positive sum game, while most political 
activity is a zero sum (or negative sum) game (Riker 1962).
But as already suggested above, this is an outdated view of politics that does not 
take into account the political significance of the increasing number of public policies 
attempting to correct various kinds of market failure. Environmental policy, for example, 
attempts to reduce negative externalities by forcing producers and consumers to include 
the social costs of pollution in their calculations. If the policy succeeds in reducing the 
gap between private and social costs, this is an improvement in allocative efficiency, a 
movement from a position off the efficiency (Pareto) frontier to a point on it. The same 
rationale applies to most other policies of social regulation such as consumer protection, 
risk management and occupational health. It is no accident that all the examples given by 
Shapiro of recent tendencies to move away from group struggle and toward "rational" 
decision making — environmental and regulatory impact statements, requirements that 
agency decisions be justified by cost-benefit analyses, and statutes that specify that 
agencies make rules on the basis of the "best available evidence" or "substantial evidence 





























































































Social regulatory policies are both politically salient and, unlike many redistributive 
policies of the past, (potentially) efficiency improving (Majone 1993). Thus it is becoming 
increasingly important to understand how the politics of efficiency differs from the politics 
of redistribution with which political scientists have been traditionally concerned. Useful 
starting points for an analysis of the politics of efficiency are Dennis Mueller’s 
comparison of the assumptions favoring the majority and unanimity rules, and George 
Tsebelis’ distinction between efficient and redistributive institutions (Mueller 1989: 96- 
111; Tsebelis 1990: 104-18).
Institutions are said to be efficient if they improve, with respect to the status quo, 
the conditions of all (or almost all) individuals or groups in a society. The example given 
by Tsebelis is an institution that solves problems of coordination or of prisoners' dilemma, 
but a more important example for our discussion is the unanimity rule. This rule is 
efficient since it guarantees that the result of collective choice is a Pareto-efficient position 
— anybody adversely affected by a collective decision can, under unanimity, veto it.
Redistributive institutions improve the conditions of one group in society at the 
expense of another. The most prominent example is, of course, majority rule. The 
advocates of majority rule envisage conflictual choices in which no mutually beneficial 
opportunities are available, as is typically the case with distributional or property rights 
issues. The advocates of majority rule also assume that the alternatives facing a 
community are single-dimensional and mutually exclusive, so that compromise proposals 
are not possible (Buchanan and Tullock 1962: 253).
By contrast, "the political process implicit in the unanimity rule argument is one of 
discussion, compromise and amendment, continuing until a formulation of the issue is 
reached benefiting all. The key assumptions underlying this view of politics are both that 
the game is cooperative and positive sum, that is, that a formulation of the issue benefiting 
all exists, and that the process can be completed in a reasonable amount of time, so that 
the transaction costs of decision making are not prohibitive" (Mueller 1989: 102; emphases 
in the original).
The comparison of efficient and redistributive institutions shows very clearly the 
crucial importance of public deliberation for the politics of efficiency. Argument and 




























































































favor of the most efficient ways of exploiting such opportunities. Naturally, the unanimity 
rule represents only an idealized model. Except perhaps for very small communities, this 
method of collective choice entails prohibitive transaction costs. Even Buchanan and 
Tullock, the most enthusiastic among the modem advocates of the rale, admit that the 
decision-time costs may be sufficiently high to rule out a full unanimity rule as a practical 
possibility. Before them, Wicksell (1896) was prepared to accept near unanimity or some 
high fractional rule (say, 75 percent) as a second-best solution. Both Wicksell and, more 
formally, Buchanan and Tullock (1962) attempt to preserve some of the advantages of 
unanimity by choosing an optimal "nonunanimity" rule. However, this is not the only 
option. With respect to policy deliberation, certain non-majoritarian institutions like the 
courts and expert administrative agencies perform functions similar to those of the 
unanimity rule.
Policy deliberation and non-maioritarian institutions
By definition, non-majoritarian institutions are not directly accountable to the people 
through elections or other political processes. Populistic democracy (Dahl 1956) has 
always been suspicious of such institutions precisely because of their independence from 
elections or direct supervision by elected officials. Even the U.S. Supreme Court has seen 
its democratic legitimacy challenged on such grounds (Freedman 1978), and similar 
concerns have impeded the development of judicial review in Europe (Volcansek 1992).
At the same time, however, courts, administrative tribunals, independent administrative 
agencies, investigating commissions, independent central banks and other non-majoritarian 
institutions play key roles in all democratic societies. In practice, it has always been 
understood that for many purposes reliance upon qualities such as expertise, 
professionalism, independence and continuity has more importance than reliance upon 
direct political accountability.
This common sense view finds support in several strands of political thought, 
especially American. One of the important contributions of James Madison in The 
Federalist has been the argument that majoritarian means cannot alone create governmental 
institutions capable of pursuing coherent policies in the public interest. A certain insulation 




























































































important safeguard against "factionalism" — the usurpation of government by powerful 
and self-interested groups — and the threats which factionalism poses to the republican 
belief in deliberative democracy. Also the tradition of the Progressive movement, 
represented by such figures as Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, attached great 
importance to the insulation of government from short-term party politics and electoral 
interests as a way of ensuring both efficiency and honesty in public affairs (Hofstadter 
1955).
Finally, the ideologists of the New Deal defended the independence of the 
regulatory commissions as necessary to the acquisition and effective use of that expertise 
which was the raison d'être of such bodies. The regulatory commissions emerged and 
became important instruments of governance for industry precisely because Congress and 
the courts proved unable to satisfy the "great functional imperative" of specialization. In 
the words of Merle Fainsod, regulatory agencies "commended themselves because they 
offered the possibility of achieving expertness in the treatment of special problems, 
relative freedom from the exigencies of party politics in their consideration and 
expeditiousness in their disposition" (Fainsod 1940: 313).
Regulation by means of independent agencies responsible for the correction of 
specific forms of market failure, is no longer a purely American phenomenon. Since the 
1970s, regulatory agencies have become an increasingly significant part of public 
administration also in Europe (Majone 1991, 1992, 1993). The functional explanations 
given by European scholars for the rise of the independent agencies are strongly 
reminiscent of the arguments of earlier American writers. Thus it is said that agencies are 
justified by the need of expertise in highly complex or technical matters; than an agency 
structure may favor public participation, while the opportunity for consultations by means 
of public hearings is often denied to government departments; that agencies’ separateness 
from government is useful whenever it is hoped to free government administration from 
partisan politics and party political influence. Agencies are also said to provide greater 
continuity and stability than cabinets because they are one step removed from election 
returns; and because of their independence, they are able to protect citizens from 




























































































issues, thus enriching public debate (Baldwin and Me Crudden 19887: 4-9; Teitgen-Colly 
1988: 37-47; Guedon 1991: 16-27).
These arguments echo many characteristic themes of the politics of efficiency: an 
awareness of the mismatch between existing institutional capacities and the growing 
complexity of policy problems; the vision of administrators as advocates of the public 
interest rather than as mere aggregators of group preferences or captives of dominant 
groups; and especially the emphasis on policy deliberation as the method for identifying 
true public values and choosing the best means for implementing such values. The 
references to public participation and to the protection of citizens from bureaucratic 
arrogance and obfuscation show that democracy is not at issue. In fact, many of those who 
espouse the model of the deliberative agency combining ethical discourse and technical 
expertise to achieve policy decisions that are both substantively correct and politically 
legitimated, recognize that such non-majoritarian institutions must be subjected to stringent 
democratic controls. To quote Martin Shapiro (1988: 34):
All interest groups are to have as nearly as possible equal 
access to the deliberators. There is to be a public record of 
the deliberation. The deliberators are to provide the public a 
reasoned explanation of their decision. In their search for 
values, administrators are to take the values incorporated into 
the governing statutes by the democratically elected 
legislature as crucial. Courts will engage in judicial review of 
administrative decisions to ensure that they are in accord with 
the values and goals of the legislature.
To summarize the argument so far, policy deliberation matters most when the issues under 
discussion have to do with efficiency rather than with pure redistribution. Public choice 
under unanimity rule represents the ideal institutional setting for public deliberation. This 
model is generally infeasible because of the high decision costs it entails, but in some 
important areas of policymaking the expert agency, disciplined by strict procedural and 
substantive requirements, may be viewed as a workable second-best solution. In the 
second part of this essay I shall discuss two characteristic ways in which ideas and 





























































































As Michael Polanyi once wrote, the existence of social tasks that appear both desirable 
and feasible but are in fact impracticable has set the stage for a wide range of conflicts in 
modem history. All the battles of social reform were fought partly on this ground, with 
conservatives overstating and progressives underestimating the limits of the possible in 
public policy (Polanyi 1951: 169). This explains why arguments about the feasibility of 
various policy proposals occupy such a central position in policy deliberation (Majone 
1989).
Causal knowledge is best expressed in the form of constraints or limiting 
conditions. This is because all theories express some kind of regularity or invariance and 
thus impose limits on the range of observable phenomena. Reality. Einstein once observed, 
restricts the wealth of logical possibilities; science attempts to discover these restrictions. 
Scientific laws "do not assert that something exists or is the case; they deny it. They insist 
on the nonexistence of certain things or states of affairs, proscribing or prohibiting, as it 
were, these things or states of affairs; they rule them out" (Popper 1968: 69). This view of 
theories as constraints is important for understanding how theoretical knowledge can be 
applied to practical problems. Consider how scientific knowledge is used in technology. 
Scientific theories do not tell engineers how to achieve particular goals. Rather, they show 
why seemingly reasonable goals are in fact infeasible; why, for example, it is impossible 
to construct engines that are 100 percent efficient, or to eliminate friction completely. In 
principle, social scientific theories can and should be used in the same way. Even if it is 
not derived from carefully controlled experiments, social knowledge often codifies a great 
deal of practical experience in which something has been attempted by many routes and 
all of them have resulted in failure. Our knowledge about bureaucracies and other social 
organizations, for instance, is largely of this kind (Downs 1966; Wilson 1989).
However, one important difference between social and physical constraints is that 
the consequences of violating the former are not usually as immediately apparent as in the 
case of physical impossibilities. For this reason it is often politically difficult to resist the 
temptation to disregard economic or institutional constraints. Rent control is a classic 
example. Although the objective of controlling rents is to protect the consumer from the 




























































































to make almost everyone worse off by discouraging the construction of rental apartments 
and the upkeep of the existing stock, while encouraging the abandonment of old housing 
units or their conversion into office space in order to escape controls. These consequences 
have been known for some time, yet a number of cities that had abandoned rent control 
during the 1950s began to reinstitute this measure with the inflation of the 1970s. 
Arguments about the negative consequences of rent control gained wider acceptance in the 
1980s as part of the general shift toward more efficient policies.
To understand the role of feasibility arguments in policy deliberation it is also 
important to distinguish between objective and self-imposed constraints (Majone 1989: 82- 
84). Objective constraints such as physical or technological limitations do not depend on 
our goals or values. We do not choose them; they are imposed on us. But many of the 
most important limitations on policymaking are not externally imposed; they are self- 
imposed, the result of a free choice or commitment. Once they are made, however, these 
commitments restrict the range of available alternatives in precisely the same way as do 
physical, technical, and other objective constraints. For example, the power to bind oneself 
is one of the most important tactics in bargaining. The negotiator who makes an 
irrevocable commitment to a certain course of action, and who succeeds in communicating 
it persuasively to the other party, has changed voluntarily and irreversibly the objective 
situation in which the negotiation takes place (Schelling 1963).
The variety of self-imposed constraints is quite large, as shown by the following 
partial categorization:
a. Constraints that are adopted for a limited purpose or time, 
or are accepted "until further notice" (for example, 
contractual commitments, rules of the game, promises, 
conventional definitions or interpretations of certain terms in 
a document, administrative procedures and routines, strategic 
commitments by which one binds oneself in continuous 
negotiations).
b. Constraints that are considered indispensable for the 
achievement of certain policy goals (for example, 
distributional constraints, rules of reciprocity, "due process", 




























































































c. Constraints that are accepted implicitly, but whose 
existence is acknowledged only when they are challenged or 
violated (for example, cultural norms, rules of etiquette, 
professional standards, tacit agreements).
A third important distinction is that between short-run and long-run constraints. In the 
short run, technology, institutions, administrative capacities, financial resources, and, in the 
very short-run, even physical inputs and manpower must be taken as given. Given 
sufficient time, however, technological limitations and institutional obstacles can be 
removed, laws changed, capacities increased, and new skills learned — usually at a cost. 
The time dimension is important because factors that might be disregarded in the short run 
can become binding constraints in a long-run perspective. Thus, the need to maintain 
continuing cooperative relationships among policy actors imposes restrictions on 
acceptable behavior that can be ignored when agreement is needed only once or only on a 
single issue.
Because of the variety of potential policy constraints, shared beliefs about the 
limits of the possible in public policy are essential to the search for collective gains. 
Argument and persuasion play a key role in identifying constraints, evaluating their 
significance for different implementation strategies, and estimating the costs and benefits 
of relaxing those constraints that are not absolutely fixed. The agreed set of constraints, 
both objective and self-imposed ones, constitute the rules of the policy game. However, 
the rules are never completely known when the game starts. This is because at the time a 
policy is initiated it is impossible to know all the relevant limiting factors, and it is often 
difficult even to tell beforehand which of the assumed constraints will actually be binding. 
As the policy moves from decision to implementation, previously hidden constraints will 
emerge, forcing more or less radical changes. This iterative process of discovering 
constraints and modifying goals or strategies accordingly is the essence of policy 
implementation.
The uncertainty surrounding the implementation process suggests that policy may 
be usefully viewed as an incomplete contract (Milgrom and Robert 1992) among the main 
actors. As Garrett and Weingast (1991) and Goldstein and Keohane (1993) have argued, 




























































































agreements are likely to be incomplete, shared beliefs about the spirit of the agreements 
are essential to the maintenance of cooperation. Consider, for example, the problem of 
differentiating between real constraints and fictitious obstacles or pseudo-constraints set by 
mental or institutional inertia, risk aversion, lack of imagination, or put up as an 
ideological screen to protect vested interests. The problem of distinguishing between real 
and apparent constraints exists even if one assumes that all actors are in good faith. In 
fact, whether or not a constraint is actually binding in a given problem can often be 
determined only after the problem has been solved. Even when there are a priori reasons 
to believe that the constraint will not be binding, it may not be wise to ignore it, for it 
could become binding if some of the data and parameters of the problem change. All these 
problems of incomplete contracting can be resolved only with the help of shared beliefs 
about the possibility of finding mutually advantageous solutions.
Ideas are important not only in identifying and categorizing policy constraints, but 
also in pushing out the boundaries of the possible in public policy. What is politically 
feasible within given constraints, and even the constraints themselves, depend on the limits 
of popular knowledge and the relation of popularly accepted values to permissible practice. 
Hence, political constraints on policy can be eased only after public opinion has been 
conditioned to accept new thinking, new symbols, and new and broader concepts of the 
public interest (Heller 1967: 27). Keynes’s contribution to the public debate on the 
problem of wartime finance in the late 1930s is an excellent example of this. From the 
outset, a biographer writes, "Keynes involved himself in the problems of war finance on 
two fronts — maximizing the possible under the existing constraints and easing the 
constraints themselves" (Moggridge 1976: 116). Keynes’s arguments created a climate of 
opinion that made war and cheap money seem compatible to the authorities. In order to 
get across the reasoning behind his plan and to find ways of making it more generally 
acceptable, Keynes engaged in a massive effort of education and persuasion. After some 
modifications, Keynes’s proposals did gain wide acceptance and became the basis of 





























































































Arguments are also used to justify policy decisions already taken. When the arguments are 
based on considerations different from those that led to the decision, they are usually 
dismissed as attempts at "rationalization". I shall try to show that this criticism, even if it 
is justified in particular cases, misses important aspects of the process by which ideas 
influence policy.
The frequent use of post-decision arguments in quite different contexts is an 
indication that such arguments may serve important social functions beyond providing 
mere "rationalizations" for politically or bureaucratically determined positions. Consider 
the case of a judge who decides a case on the basis of his or her subjective notion of 
fairness, a hunch that a particular decision would be right, while realizing at the same time 
that considerations of this kind do not count as justifications for a binding determination. 
Thus, the judge frames her opinion in the objective categories of legal argument, and any 
subsequent developments in the case (for example, an appeal) will be based on the 
published opinion, not on the actual process followed by the judge in coming to the 
conclusion. In fact, most legal systems allow the opinion stating the reasons for a judicial 
decision to follow rather than precede the decision. Also, different judges may agree on a 
decision but disagree about the best way to justify it; in the American system they are 
given the opportunity to present their positions in separate arguments.
Such procedural rules must appear absurd to somebody who assumes that a judicial 
opinion is an accurate description of the decision process followed by the judge in coming 
to a conclusion. If, however, the opinion is viewed as a report of justificatory procedures 
employed by the judge, then the appeal to legal and logical considerations which possibly 
played no role in the actual decision process becomes quite understandable (Wasserstrom 
1961). In fact, the judge’s opinion is not the premise of a syllogism that concludes in the 
decision; it is, rather, a means of exercising rational control over conclusions that may be 
suggested by extralegal considerations, and of facilitating communication among 
participants in the legal process.
Scientific reports play a role similar to that of the judge’s opinion in facilitating 
communication within the scientific community. According to a distinguished physicist 
and philosopher of science, scientific reports "are not diaries or journals, telling us exactly 




























































































edited version of such events, and inform us what ought to happen if you try to repeat the 
experiment yourself under the prescribed conditions" (Ziman 1968: 35). The 
communication of the experimenter to his or her colleagues is not merely an exposition of 
what happened when certain operations were performed; rather, it is an attempt to 
convince them that the results are plausible and interesting, and that they deserve further 
discussion.
As my third example I take a well known episode in the history of the diffusion of 
economic ideas. President Franklin D.Roosevelt’s policy of increased government spending 
to reduce unemployment and get out of the depression has been called keynesian. But 
Roosevelt did not have to learn about government spending from Keynes. The idea that 
the influence of the British economist lay behind the policies of the New Deal began to 
take root fairly early, but it is only a legend (Winch 1969). The theories of Keynes only 
provided a sophisticated rationalization for what Roosevelt was doing anyway. The 
answers that these theories provided to questions about the causes of long-term 
unemployment and the reasons for the effectiveness of public spending were not 
prerequisites for Roosevelt’s expansionist fiscal policy. But as these answers came to 
dominate the thinking of economists and politicians, they helped to make expansionist 
fiscal policy the core idea of liberal economic policy for several decades. In the words of 
a former chairman of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers, "[wjithout Keynes, 
and especially without the interpretation of Keynes by his followers, expansionist fiscal 
policy might have remained an occasional emergency measure and not become a way of 
life" (Stein 1984: 39).
These examples reveal three main functions of post-decision arguments. First, they 
serve to rationalize policy in the sense of providing a conceptual foundation for a set of 
otherwise discrete and disjointed decisions. Policymakers often act in accordance with 
pressures from external events or the force of personal convictions. In such cases 
arguments are needed after the decision is made to explain it, to show that it fits into the 
framework of existing policy, to increase assent, to discover new implications, and to 
anticipate or answer criticism. Moreover, since policies exist for some time, their political 




























































































give the policy components the greatest possible internal coherence and the closest fit to 
an ever-changing environment.
Second, post-decision arguments serve to institutionalize ideas. Stein’s observation 
about the importance of keynesian ideas in making expansionist fiscal policy "a way of 
life" captures the essence of the process. In a similar vein, Garrett and Weingast (1991) 
have shown how the idea of "mutual recognition", already present in the Treaty of Rome 
creating the European Economic Community, became institutionalized through the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and several documents of the European 
Commission. In this form, the idea had a powerful influence on the development and 
implementation of the internal market program. It is important to note that the relationship 
between policy and institutionalized ideas (or meta-policvl is a dialectic one. Rather than 
disclosing new possibilities, such ideas only codify initial practice; at the same time, 
however, they serve to rationalize, evaluate and transform that same practice. Hence, our 
understanding of the way a policy develops cannot be separated from the institutionalized 
ideas and theories by which the policy is guided and evaluated (Majone 1989: 146-49).
The third, and perhaps most important, function of post-decision arguments is to 
transform a single play into a sequential game by facilitating communication and 
monitoring. Only the judge’s written opinion, not her decision as such, allows interested 
parties to make further moves like appealing the decision. It is important to keep in mind 
that in this as in other legal proceedings such as constitutional judicial review, the issue is 
what reasons can be given, even if those reasons are entirely post-hoc. This shows that the 
purpose of the giving reasons requirement is not to improve the quality of a single 
decision but to facilitate the development of the entire process.
Our previous discussion of judicial review of regulatory agencies is also relevant 
here. The requirement that administrators give reasons for their decisions (as demanded by 
the U.S. Administrative Procedures Act or Article 190 of the EEC Treaty) generates a 
record consisting not only of the reasons actually given, but also of the statutes or treaty 
articles that those reasons elaborate. Thus, the giving reason requirement opens the door to 
a dialogue about rival statutory interpretations by court and agency. Also public 
participation and policy deliberation are possible only if administrators have to give 




























































































The importance of transforming a single piay into an iterated game has been 
demonstrated by game theory. In a prisoners’ dilemma situation repetition allows more 
complicated strategies than simply "cooperate" or "defect". When the game is repeated 
patterns of cooperation emerge that would be highly unlikely in a single play. The giving 
reasons requirement changes one-shot situations into iterated or sequential games. Hence it 
is an efficient institution designed to facilitate cooperation among policy actors.
Conclusion: the revival of government by discussion?
Deliberation is so much at the heart of democratic politics and policy that democracy has 
been called a system of government by discussion. Political parties, the electorate, the 
legislature, the executive, the courts, the media, interest groups, and independent experts 
all engage in a continuous process of debate and reciprocal persuasion. This process, as 
liberal theorists from John Stuart Mill and Walter Bageitot to Lord Lindsay and Ernest 
Barker have described it, begins with expressions of general concerns and ends in concrete 
decisions. Each stage of deliberation has its own function and its own organ. Parties 
identify issues and formulate programs; the electorate discusses issues and candidates and 
expresses a majority in favor of one of the programs; the legislative majority translates 
programs into laws, in constant debate with the opposition; finally, the discussion is 
carried forward to the chief executive and the cabinet where it is translated into specific 
policies. Each of the stages and organs of public deliberation is independent, but only 
within the limits, and as a part, of the entire process.
Liberal theorists understood that unregulated discussion easily ends in unending 
dispute and even in violence. An unorganized deliberative body is open to various forms 
of disruption, such as filibustering. To avoid or reduce these dangers, public deliberation 
has been carefully institutionalized in all modem democracies. Today’s elaborate codes of 
parliamentary, electoral, administrative, and judicial procedure are the fruit of centuries of 
experience in coping with practical problems of public deliberation. The general purpose 
of these procedures is to ensure the hearing of many opinions without compromising the 
need to reach a conclusion. Their importance is such that the history of democratic 
government may be considered the history of various procedures devised to institutionaiize 




























































































However, while rules of debate have hardened into institutions in the traditional 
forums of public deliberation, in newer arenas of debate, such as environmental and health 
regulation or risk management, appropriate procedures and standards of argument are still 
lacking. This is due to the intrinsic complexity of the issues, but also to the fact that 
debate about such issues is increasingly transnational, so that its institutionalization 
requires the creation of supranational rules and administrative capacities. The difficulty of 
the task is demonstrated by the opposition of the states of the European Community to the 
idea of European regulatory agencies. In this case, the traditional resistance to the 
diffraction of state power through wide grants of regulatory discretion to non-majoritarian 
institutions is reinforced by fears about the loss of national sovereignty.
Even at the national level, the task of redesigning the institutions of public 
deliberation in order to adapt them to the growing complexity of policy problems, has 
been largely neglected. Indeed, until recently the very idea of government by discussion 
appeared to be hopelessly outdated. I have argued that the current fascination with policy 
deliberation is closely related to the rediscovery of efficiency, and of the limits of the 
possible in public policy, as central themes of political discourse. Now we understand that 
the insistence of the liberal theorists on the importance of deliberation rested on the 
distinction between efficient and redistributive policies — a distinction which usually 
remained implicit. As Dennis Mueller has pointed out, it was one of Wicksell’s important 
insights to have explicitly recognized the distinction between allocation and redistribution 
decisions, and the need to treat these decisions with separate collective decision processes. 
The neglect of distributive issues in economic and social regulation does not imply that 
such issues are unimportant, but only that policies designed to correct market failures are 
poor redistributive instruments. Paradoxically, the past emphasis on equity to the exclusion 
of efficiency often made the poorest people worse off. To avoid such undesirable 
consequences in the future it is important to emphasize that politics is concerned with 
efficiency as well as redistribution, and that the two groups of issues should be dealt with 
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When Does Policy Deliberation
Matter?
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